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An Indian Sphere of Influence in the 
Indian Ocean? 
David Brewster 
India has an expansive maritime strategy.  Driven by great power aspirations and by strategic 
rivalry with China, India is expanding its naval capabilities and security relationships throughout 
the Indian Ocean region.  India has paid significant attention to developing relationships at the 
key points of entry into the Indian Ocean—the Malacca Strait, the Persian Gulf and southern 
Africa.  The purpose of this article is to examine India’s maritime ambitions and relationships in 
the Indian Ocean and ask whether this may presage an extended Indian sphere of influence in 
the region. 
This article will consider India’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean.  It 
will commence with an overview of the growth of maritime perspectives in 
Indian strategic thinking and the expansion of India’s naval capabilities 
against a backdrop of Sino-Indian strategic rivalry.  It will review some of 
India’s key security relationships in the Indian Ocean and then consider the 
potential for the development of an Indian sphere of interest across the 
Indian Ocean region.  What might this mean for littoral and other states as 
India emerges as a major regional power? 
The Maritime Dimension in Indian Strategic Thinking 
Among the changes in Indian strategic thinking in recent years has been a 
partial reorientation in India’s strategic outlook towards the maritime 
dimension.  Indian strategic thinking has traditionally had a continental 
outlook.  For thousands of years military threats to India have been 
perceived as coming primarily from India’s north-west.  This was reinforced 
by India’s experience in the twentieth century, when any direct military 
threats to India—from Japan, Pakistan and China—were land-based.  The 
continuing threats on India’s western and northern borders and from 
domestic insurgencies has led to the Indian Army holding an indisputedly 
dominant position within the Indian military establishment.  
However, there is a developing view among some Indian strategists of India 
as a maritime power—that India’s peninsular character and geographic 
position gives the Indian Ocean a preponderant influence over India’s 
destiny.  Some Indian leaders have drawn a close connection between 
India’s maritime ambitions and its destiny as a great power. As former Indian 
Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, commented, 
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after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are once again 
turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of 
view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself, not simply as a continental 
power, but even more so as a maritime power, and consequently as one 
that is of significance on the world stage (emphasis added).1 
One could also argue that any significant geographic expansion of Indian 
influence can only take place in the maritime domain.  As Rajiv Sikri, a 
former Secretary in the India’s Foreign Ministry, commented: “If India aspires 
to be a great power, then the only direction in which India’s strategic 
influence can spread is across the seas.  In every other direction there are 
formidable constraints.”2 
India’s standing as the most populous state in the Indian Ocean region and 
its central position in the northern Indian Ocean have long contributed to 
beliefs about India’s destiny to control its eponymous ocean.  According to 
some there is now a well established tradition among the Indian strategic 
community that the Indian Ocean is, or should be, “India’s Ocean”.  Many in 
the Indian Navy see it as destined to become the predominant maritime 
security provider in a region stretching from the Red Sea to Singapore and 
having a significant security role in areas beyond.3  According to one 
observer: 
New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both 
natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the 
predominant influence in this region—the world's only region and ocean 
named after a single state. This is what the United States set out to do in 
North America and the Western Hemisphere at an early stage in America's 
"rise to power".4 
Many Indian maritime strategists see predominance in the Indian Ocean as 
potentially also delivering significant influence in East Asia.  Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, the nineteenth century American naval strategist, is frequently cited 
by Indian strategic thinkers, including a statement (incorrectly) attributed to 
Mahan that: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. In the 21st 
century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”  
Increased enthusiasm for maritime power has been accompanied by an 
expansion in India’s naval capabilities.  During the Cold War, India’s ability to 
pursue its maritime ambitions was severely constrained and for decades 
following independence the Indian Navy was known as the “Cinderella” of 
the Indian armed forces.  However, since the mid-1990s, India has 
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embarked on a major program to develop a “Blue Water” navy involving 
significant increases in naval expenditure.  India’s armed forces budget grew 
at an annual rate of 5% from 2001 to 2005 and at around 10% from 2005 to 
2008.  As the same time, the navy’s share of the increasing defence budget 
has risen from 11% in 1992/93 to 18% in 2008/09. Increased capital 
expenditure has encouraged plans for significant changes in the Indian 
Navy’s force structure, with an emphasis on sea control capabilities. Plans 
announced in 2008 call for a fleet of over 160 ships by 2022, including three 
aircraft carriers and 60 major combatant ships, as well as almost 400 naval 
aircraft.  According to Admiral Arun Prakash, the former Indian Chief of 
Naval Staff, India aims to exercise selective sea control of the Indian Ocean 
through task forces built around three aircraft carriers that will form the core 
of separate fleets in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian 
Sea.5  The rapidly expanding Indian Coast Guard may also play an important 
complementary role to the Indian Navy, particularly in circumstances where 
there are reasons to emphasise policing functions over the military 
dimension. 
In conjunction with an expansion in naval capabilities, over the last decade 
or so India has been quietly expanding its influence throughout the Indian 
Ocean.  The Indian Navy has been active in developing security 
relationships that are intended to enhance India’s ability to project power and 
restrict China’s ability to develop security relationships in the region.  Given 
that the Indian Ocean is in many ways an enclosed sea, the Indian Navy has 
given particular focus to the “choke points” at entrances to the ocean around 
southern Africa (including the Mozambique Channel), the Arabian peninsula 
(including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb) and the straits 
connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through the Indonesian 
archipelago (the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits).  According to the 
Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine, “Control of the choke points could be 
useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the 
currency of military power remains a stark reality.”6  The Indian Navy has 
also sought to institutionalise itself as the leading Indian Ocean power 
through such initiatives as sponsoring the multilateral Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium, to which the navies of all Indian Ocean littoral states have been 
invited by India.7  
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India’s naval ambitions have not been without critics.  Given the long-
standing lack of co-ordination in strategic planning in New Delhi, the Indian 
Navy’s activist role in the Indian Ocean has often been ahead of the views 
within the other armed services and the government. There is long running 
tension between the Indian Navy and Foreign Ministry over the navy’s 
assertive regional policy, including over the 2008 decision to participate in 
anti-piracy operations off Somalia.8  According to some, the Foreign Ministry 
repeatedly turned down requests from the Indian Navy to conduct naval 
interceptions.  It is not clear to what extent these tensions merely reflect 
bureaucratic caution or a more fundamental disagreement over the Indian 
Navy’s regional strategy.  Others are sceptical about the ability of India to 
transform itself from a continental to a maritime power.  Sahni, for example, 
warns that the Soviet Union’s failed attempts to become a naval power in the 
1970s and 1980s should act as “a cautionary tale for India’s Mahanian 
navalists … [and] a grim warning of what happens to a continental state that 
harbours overly grandiose maritime ambitions”.9 
Over the last decade or more the United States has actively encouraged 
India’s strategic ambitions in the region. In March 2005, the Bush 
administration announced that it would “help India become a major world 
power in the 21st century”, adding that “We understand fully the implications, 
including the military implications, of that statement.”10  The United States 
has focused on assisting in the expansion of India’s power projection 
capabilities and its role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean.  As US 
Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter commented in 2008, the United States 
welcomed India “taking up the responsibility to ensure security in this part of 
the world”.11  The United States has given particular encouragement to 
India’s naval presence in the northeast Indian Ocean, including in the 
development of facilities at India’s Andaman Island naval base at the 
western end of the Malacca Strait.  Much of this reflects a desire by the 
United States to see India grow as a regional balancing factor against 
China.12  
The role of the United States in encouraging the development of India as a 
regional naval power in the Indian Ocean has been compared with Britain’s 
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strategy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it found 
itself challenged by the growth of German naval power.  Britain then forged 
partnerships with emerging naval powers, the United States in the western 
hemisphere and Japan in the Pacific, allowing them a measure of regional 
hegemony, while Britain concentrated its resources in the North Atlantic 
against Germany.13  This analogy, while far from perfect, does capture some 
of the factors present in US thinking, particularly its perceptions of the 
growing maritime threat presented by China. 
China’s “String of Pearls” in the Indian Ocean 
Naval competition with China has been an important factor in driving India’s 
strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean.  While the Indian Navy’s immediate 
objectives involve countering Pakistan and enforcing control over India’s 
exclusive economic zone, the potential for China to project naval power into 
the Indian Ocean has arguably become its principal long term source of 
concern. 
In the mid-1980s, China began implementing plans to build a blue-water 
navy.  Although focused on protecting China’s interests in the western 
Pacific Ocean, in particular the Taiwan Strait, this development also has long 
term implications for India.  China’s naval capabilities now exceed India’s by 
a considerable margin in both quantitative and qualitative terms.  However, 
its ability to project power into the Indian Ocean is severely limited by the 
distance from ports in southern China and its lack of logistical support in the 
Indian Ocean, as well as China’s need to deploy to the Indian Ocean through 
choke points, principally the Strait of Malacca.  
China’s perceived attempts to overcome these strategic limitations in the 
Indian Ocean region have been called its “String of Pearls” strategy.14  China 
has been developing political relationships and commercial interests in the 
Indian Ocean region for some years, including its de facto alliance with 
Pakistan and good political and economic relations with Burma, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka.  According to Indian reports, China has been involved in the 
development of military-related facilities in the region, including the Chinese 
constructed port at Gwadar in Pakistan and communications facilities in 
Burma’s Coco islands in the Andaman Sea (both of which, it has been 
claimed, include Chinese signals intelligence facilities).15  Chinese interests 
have also been involved in the development of several commercial port 
facilities, including in Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and there are oft 
repeated claims that China might have secured naval access rights as part 
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of these developments.16 Indian analysts are also concerned about China’s 
naval contribution to anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and recent 
suggestions by a senior Chinese naval official for the establishment of a 
permanent base in area to support Chinese ships.17  
Some analysts are sceptical of Indian claims about China’s intentions in the 
northern Indian Ocean, particularly assertions of a Chinese naval presence 
in Burma and the Andaman Sea.18  Many claims about Chinese “ports” or 
“bases” appear to be exaggerated or groundless.  China has been involved 
in the construction of the Pakistani commercial and naval port of Gwadar 
and in the upgrading of Burmese naval facilities. However, other allegations 
about “Chinese bases” appear to be merely based on Chinese involvement 
in the development of commercial port infrastructure.  In addition, China has 
taken few steps in acquiring a military power projection capacity that could 
reach into the Indian Ocean region.  The Chinese navy has no historical 
traditions of projecting power beyond coastal waters. It has built no aircraft 
carriers and has no intercontinental bombers.  It has only a very small fleet 
of in-flight refuelling and airborne command and control aircraft and has only 
a relatively small number of blue water naval combatant vessels.19 While 
China may well desire to have the capability to project military power into the 
Indian Ocean region, it would seem that it will be a long while before such 
any capabilities come to fruition.20 
Despite these questions about China’s intentions and capabilities, the String 
of Pearls theory is widely followed in New Delhi, in some quarters almost to 
the point of obsession.  China’s relationships in the Indian Ocean region are 
often not perceived in the Indian security community as being a legitimate 
reflection of Chinese commercial interests in the region or its strategic 
interests in protecting its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) across the 
Indian Ocean.  Instead, many perceive China’s regional relationships as 
being directed against India—either as a plan of maritime “encirclement” of 
India or otherwise intended to keep India strategically preoccupied in South 
Asia.  Others who acknowledge China’s interests in SLOC security argue 
that China is “overstepping” the mark in developing influence in the Indian 
Ocean region, creating a security dilemma for India. Although few suggest 
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that any Chinese threat to India is likely to be primarily seaborne, many in 
New Delhi see at least a significant risk that India and China will, as the 
former Indian Chief of Naval Staff called it, “compete and even clash in the 
same strategic space”.21  A recent suggestion by the junior Defence Minister, 
Pallam Raju, that India might “assist” China in providing maritime security to 
Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean22 involves an important acknowledgement 
that China has legitimate security concerns in the Indian Ocean.  The 
recently appointed Indian National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, 
has also proposed a cooperative security arrangement among major Asian 
powers (including the United States), encompassing the Indian Ocean and 
the Western Pacific.23  Given the broader context of Sino-Indian strategic 
rivalry it seems unlikely that China would be prepared to rely on India for its 
maritime security needs in the Indian Ocean region, certainly outside of a 
multilateral arrangement. 
India has responded to China’s perceived Indian Ocean strategy in several 
ways.  First, as noted above, it is expanding its own power projection 
capabilities.  Second, it has sought to pre-empt the development by China of 
security relationships in the Indian Ocean through the development of India’s 
own relationships in the region.  Third, India is seeking to develop a security 
presence in and around the Malacca Strait as part of a wider emphasis on 
maritime choke points.  
India’s Pearls in the Indian Ocean 
Over the last decade or so, India has developed good security relationships 
with many states throughout the Indian Ocean, with particular focus on the 
maritime choke points of the Mozambique Channel in the southwest Indian 
Ocean, the Persian Gulf in the northwest and the Malacca Strait in the 
northeast.  India is also developing a security presence in the central Indian 
Ocean astride the east-west SLOCs across the Indian Ocean.  
SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN 
The southwestern Indian Ocean forms the gateway between the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans.  
India’s security relationships in the region are anchored by its close 
relationship with Mauritius, the island territory that lies around 900km to the 
east of Madagascar.  India has long-standing and close political, economic 
and security associations with Mauritius.  Some 70% of the Mauritian 
population is of Indian ethnic origin and for several decades Mauritius has 
acted as the primary gateway for international investment into India 
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(originating from the United States, Europe and elsewhere), largely due to 
favourable tax arrangements.24  Former Mauritian Prime Minister Paul 
Berenger described the bilateral relationship as “umbilical and sacred” and 
security relations as “intense”.25  The current President Anerood Jugnauth 
describes the connection in terms of “blood relations”.26  
The Mauritian elite see India in largely benign terms and appear to have 
accepted India as having a special role in Mauritian security.  Cooperation is 
formalised in a 1974 defence agreement under which India has transferred 
patrol boats and helicopters to Mauritius (including the supply of a patrol 
vessel in 2010) and provides training to Mauritian personnel and officers for 
the Mauritian National Coast Guard and Police Helicopter Squadron 
(effectively the Mauritian navy and air force).  Since 2003, the Indian Navy 
has also provided maritime security through periodic patrols of Mauritian 
waters including anti-piracy patrols in 2010.27  India also backs Mauritius’ 
territorial claims to Diego Garcia which was separated from Mauritian 
administration in the 1960s.28 
Mauritian political leaders have publicly indicated on several occasions that 
India would be permitted to establish naval facilities on Mauritius if it so 
wished29and there are claims that India already operates a signals 
intelligence station.30  In 2006 and 2007 there were reports of discussions 
between the Mauritian and Indian governments over the long term lease to 
the Indian government of the Agalega islands (which lie between the island 
of Mauritius and the Seychelles), ostensibly for tourism.31  It has been 
speculated that India’s intention was to upgrade the Agalega airstrip to 
service Indian manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft.32  Discussions 
over the proposal reportedly ended due to political sensitivities concerning 
the local creole population (contemplating, perhaps, the complaints of the 
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Diego Garcians who were dispossessed from their islands following a deal 
between the British and Mauritian governments).  
India also has growing security relationships with Madagascar, Mozambique 
and the Seychelles, littoral states in and around the crucial Mozambique 
channel, the SLOC used by shipping transiting the Cape of Good Hope.  The 
security of the Seychelles was highly contested during the latter half of the 
Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union competed to maintain or 
establish a security presence there.  At the same time, India was seen by the 
Seychelles as a benign regional protector.  In the early 1980s, Seychelles’ 
leftist President Albert Rene sought commitments from Indira Gandhi to 
intervene in the case of an attempted coup.  Although Gandhi declined to 
provide public commitments, India did contribute two helicopters and training 
to the Seychelles security forces.33  The Indian Navy has assisted with 
maritime security in the Seychelles EEZ under a 2003 defence cooperation 
agreement under which it provided anti-piracy patrols in early 2010.34  In 
2005 India gifted a patrol boat to the Seychelles—reportedly in a hurried 
effort to pre-empt offers of Chinese assistance.35  In July 2007 the Indian 
Navy opened an electronic monitoring facility in northern Madagascar at the 
head of the Mozambique Channel36 and reportedly has also been granted 
“limited” berthing rights in Madagascar for Indian naval vessels.37  The Indian 
Navy has also acted as a maritime security provider for Mozambique, 
including taking responsibility for maritime security during the 2003 African 
Union and 2004 World Economic Forum summits held in Maputo.38  In 2006, 
India and Mozambique entered a defence cooperation agreement that 
envisages joint maritime patrols, supply of military equipment, training and 
technology transfer in repairing and assembling military vehicles, aircraft and 
ships.39   
India’s maritime security relationships in the southwestern Indian Ocean are 
also buttressed by growing maritime security relations with France and 
South Africa.  Since 2001 the Indian Navy has conducted annual exercises 
with the French navy, which operates out of Reunion and Djibouti.  India has 
also sponsored the “IBSA” trilateral security dialogue among India, Brazil 
and South Africa, pursuant to which trilateral naval exercises have been held 
in 2008 and 2010 off the Cape of Good Hope.  Further south, India also has 
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a growing presence in Antarctica, with one active research station and a 
second due to open in 2012. 
While some might see India as holding a strong security role in the 
southwest Indian Ocean, there are fears in New Delhi that China might 
undermine or pre-empt Indian’s relationships.  According to the former Indian 
Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Prakash, India “cannot afford to have any 
hostile or inimical power threatening the island states in this region”.40  
Political and economic relations between China and Mauritius and 
Seychelles are closely watched by New Delhi41 and it has been claimed that 
a so-called Chinese “thrust” towards these states presages Sino-naval rivalry 
in the western Indian Ocean.42  While China may develop better economic 
and political interests in the area, it seems unlikely that it would be able to 
dislodge India as the dominant security provider to Mauritius and there are 
no indications at present that it would be able to seriously challenge India’s 
maritime security role elsewhere in the southwest Indian Ocean. 
NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN 
India historically exercised a special political and economic role in the 
northwest Indian Ocean.  During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, British India was the dominant economic, political and military 
force in the region.  The Trucial States (now United Arab Emirates) and 
Aden (now Yemen) were administered from British India and British Indian 
Army garrisons were stationed throughout the Persian Gulf until 1947.  
India’s influence in the region diminished significantly following 
independence.  Although India generally adopted a pro-Arab foreign policy, 
its ties in the region were regularly strained as a result of the India-Pakistan 
conflict. Pakistan’s close political, economic and military ties with many 
states continue to this day.43  Some argue that the ability of India to extend 
its security presence in the northwest Indian Ocean has also been 
constrained by US predominance in the Gulf, leaving little room for India to 
develop its own relationships, and that the United States has not encouraged 
an increased Indian security presence there.  This perception is reinforced 
by the fact that the US military relationship with India is the responsibility of 
US Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, while the US security presence in 
the northwest Indian Ocean is administered by the US Central Command 
(which also has responsibility for the US military relationship with Pakistan). 
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Despite these constraints, India is developing security relations in the region, 
particularly with Qatar (which sits inside the Persian Gulf), and Oman (which 
sits on the Strait of Hormuz at the head of the Persian Gulf).  They may see 
India as partially balancing their security relationships with the United States.  
Since 2003, India has entered into several defence agreements with Oman 
dealing with training, maritime security cooperation and joint exercises.44  
The Indian Air Force uses the Thumrait air base for transit purposes and 
Oman has offered the Indian Navy berthing facilities in support of anti-piracy 
patrols.45  In 2008 India also entered into a security agreement with Qatar 
which, according to some reports, includes Indian security guarantees.  The 
agreement, which was reportedly entered following “persistent” efforts of 
Qatar, deals among other things with maritime security and intelligence 
sharing.  One Indian official commented that, “The agreement is just short of 
stationing troops (in the region)”,46 while another was reported as 
commenting that “We will go to the rescue of Qatar if Qatar requires it, in 
whatever form it takes.”47  The Indian Navy has also sought to play an active 
role in Somali-based piracy and since October 2008 has one or two vessels 
in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia. India’s contribution has been made 
separately from the US-sponsored Combined Task Forces 150 and 151, in 
which Pakistan has played an active role.48   
CENTRAL INDIAN OCEAN 
The two island chains that dominate the central Indian Ocean are the British-
administered Indian Ocean Territory (which hosts the US air and naval base 
on Diego Garcia) and the Maldives.  These island chains run north-south, 
astride the major east-west SLOCs between East Asia and the Middle East.  
India has long regarded the Maldives as falling within its South Asian sphere 
of influence.  In 1988, with the apparent blessing of the United States and 
Britain, India sent troops and naval forces to the Maldives to support 
President Gayoom in an attempted coup by Sri Lankan mercenaries.  Since 
that time, India has supplied the Maldivian armed forces with equipment and 
training and the Indian Navy has provided maritime security.  In August 
2009, a security agreement was formalised that will significantly enhance 
India’s capabilities in the central Indian Ocean.  India has been granted use 
of the former British naval and air base on Gan Island, part of the 
southernmost group of islands in the Maldives (lying around 1,000 km south 
of India and around 700 km north of Diego Garcia).  India is reportedly 
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planning to base Dornier aircraft and helicopters at Gan, although it is 
unclear to what extent the Indian Navy will establish a permanent presence 
at the associated Gan naval facilities.  India also reportedly plans to station 
aircraft and naval vessels at Male in the central Maldives and at Haa Dhalu 
Atoll in the north.49  As part of the agreement, India is also building a system 
of 26 electronic monitoring facilities across the Maldives archipelago.  
According to the Maldivian President, the installations are to protect the 
Maldives’ large EEZ from illegal fishing.50 
NORTHEAST INDIAN OCEAN  
India has placed considerable emphasis on developing a security presence 
in the northeast Indian Ocean.  There are several dimensions to this: first, 
India’s direct security presence in the Andaman Sea, second, its bilateral 
security relationships in the region and third, its aspirations to gain a security 
role in the Malacca Strait.  While India aspires to play a significant security 
role in Southeast Asia it has given particular focus to the Malacca Strait, the 
key maritime choke point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
India’s Andaman and Nicobar islands, which run north-south through the 
Andaman Sea form a natural base for projecting power into the Strait and 
beyond into the South China Sea.  In the mid-1990s, India commenced 
development of military facilities in the Andaman Islands for a new tri-service 
Andaman & Nicobar Command.  This chain of bases now includes extensive 
port facilities to service elements of the Indian Eastern Fleet and several 
bases for surveillance and strike aircraft.  The operational radius of aircraft 
based there encompasses the Malacca Strait and large portions of the South 
China Sea.51  The Andaman Islands have particular significance for the 
security of the Strait and have been described by one Chinese naval writer 
as constituting a “metal chain” that could lock the western end of the Strait 
tight.52 
India’s security relationships in the region are anchored by Singapore.  
During colonial times Singapore effectively acted as the eastern anchor to 
British India’s political and security sphere.  On gaining independence in 
1965, Singapore courted India to act as its “natural” security provider, 
including requests for the stationing of Indian naval vessels.  However India, 
under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, declined any security role in the region.  
With the end of the Cold War India renewed its links with Singapore, which 
now acts as India’s primary economic, political and security partner in 
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Southeast Asia.  Singapore sees India as having an important security role 
in the region, acting as a balance to other extra-regional powers, including 
China, the United States and Japan.53  India and Singapore conduct 
extensive security cooperation, including broad-based security dialogues, 
joint exercises, intelligence sharing and cooperation in defence technology. 
The two have conducted annual bilateral naval exercises since 1993 and 
now stage annual large-scale exercises between all three armed services.  
In a first for India, Singapore has been granted long term use of Indian 
facilities to conduct air and army training.  It has been reported that there is 
an arrangement allowing for “frequent visits” of Indian naval vessels to 
Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, and the development of an Indian naval 
logistical presence in Singapore seems not beyond the realms of 
possibility.54  
India has also been developing its security relationship with Indonesia, 
although more slowly.  While Indonesia has been very supportive of India 
developing its political and economic links with ASEAN states over the last 
two decades, it is only in recent years that the relationship has developed a 
security element.55  A Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2001.  
In 2002 concerns about the potential use of the Andaman Sea as a 
communication route with extremist groups in the region (including claimed 
links between Jihadist terrorists and Aceh separatists) led to the 
commencement of biannual “coordinated” naval patrols between the Indian 
and Indonesian navies in the Six-Degree Channel at the northern entrance 
to the Malacca Strait.  These patrols comprise Indian and Indonesian 
vessels and aircraft, co-ordinated out of India’s Joint Operations Command 
in the Andaman Islands.  In recent years India has been pressing Indonesia 
to extend naval cooperation into the Strait itself. 
The Strait of Malacca, which represents a key choke point between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans, forms a focus of India’s maritime security 
ambitions in the northeast Indian Ocean.  Arguably, the potential to exercise 
a significant degree of control over shipping movements through the Strait is 
a prerequisite of effective control of the eastern Indian Ocean.  Some have 
argued that for India the Strait represents a rough counterpart to the 
importance of the Panama Canal to the United States in terms of its ability to 
maintain regional hegemony.56  Others place it as the mid-point in an “arc of 
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rivalry” between India and China stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Sea 
of Japan.57  
The Malacca Strait is one of the world’s busiest waterways, with over 62,000 
ship movements in 2006. It is the key trade route between East Asia and 
Europe, carrying an estimated one third of global trade and the bulk of 
energy supplies from the Middle East to East Asia (including an estimated 
70-80% of China’s energy imports and 90% of Japan’s).58 The Strait is 
considered to be particularly prone to piracy and terrorist attacks.  In the 
early years of last decade there were widely-held concerns about the level of 
sea-robbery of ships transiting the Strait, although reported cases of sea 
robbery in the Malacca Strait and surrounding areas have fallen significantly 
in recent years due to improved land policing, improved economic conditions 
and the end of the insurgency in Indonesia’s Aceh province.  Since 2001, 
politically motivated piracy or terrorism has also been of concern, although 
no such attacks have eventuated.  The Strait is largely within the territorial 
waters of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, with the latter two states in 
particular being highly sensitive to the presence of any “external” maritime 
security providers in the Strait. 
In the wake of September 2001, at the invitation of the United States, India 
took a security role inside the Strait through the provision of naval escorts for 
high value commercial traffic, as part of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Since then, India has been careful to position itself as a benign 
security provider in the Strait, and to ensure that any naval presence was 
seen as “non-intrusive, cooperative and benign” by the littoral states.59 
According to one Indian naval officer: “Our role [in the Malacca Strait] is 
being perceived as that of a responsible nation, which can create a balance 
in the region.  Also, everyone realises that India has no ambitions of 
hegemony.”60  India has regularly pressured littoral states over the last 
decade to take an active security role in the Strait and in June 2006 the 
Indian Defence Minister Mukherjee reaffirmed India’s offers to provide 
assistance.61  However, India’s official justification for its interest in the 
Strait—that is, securing the Strait from threats of piracy and terrorism—holds 
little water.  Not only are these primarily policing rather than military issues, 
the reported statistics in recent years clearly demonstrate that there is no 
crisis requiring external intervention.62  It is evident that India’s interest in the 
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Strait is primarily motivated by a desire to enhance its role as the leading 
maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean and potentially control access 
to the Indian Ocean.  However, the littoral states (and in particular, Malaysia) 
have resisted giving India a formal security role in the Strait, either on a 
bilateral basis or in the various cooperative security arrangements that have 
been put in place (including the MALSINDO coordinated naval patrols, the 
ReCAAP information sharing centre, and the so-called Cooperative 
Mechanism).  It remains to be seen whether there are circumstances in 
which the littoral states would agree to India’s requests for a direct security 
role in the Strait. 
An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean? 
To what extent should India’s maritime security relationships in the Indian 
Ocean be seen as the beginnings of an Indian sphere of influence in the 
region?  
Discussions of an Indian sphere of influence beyond South Asia are 
sometimes identified with Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy who advocated 
the adoption of a “Forward Policy” to secure India at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  Curzon’s so-called Forward School argued that India’s 
security demanded control of the maritime routes and key ports en route to 
India (including Aden and Singapore) and the creation of territorial buffers to 
insulate direct contact with other empires (including Afghanistan in the west, 
Tibet in the north and Siam in the east) and for British India to take an active 
role in managing the affairs of the buffer zones.   
In many ways the policies of the British Raj represented a significant 
departure from Indian traditions which had little history of territorial 
expansion or military or political adventure beyond the limits of the 
subcontinent.  Tanham’s study of India’s strategic culture in the early 1990s 
characterized Indian strategic thinking as being “defensive” and having a 
“lack of an expansionist military tradition”.63  Certainly, any affirmation of an 
Indian security sphere beyond South Asia largely ceased following 
independence.  After 1947, India effectively withdrew to the Indian 
subcontinent and asserted what has been called “India’s Monroe Doctrine” 
according to which India would not permit any intervention by any “external” 
power in India’s immediate neighbours in South Asia and related islands.  
While India’s attempts to exclude other powers from South Asia had only 
limited success, India’s Monroe Doctrine was used to justify military 
interventions in Sri Lanka and Maldives in the 1980s.64   
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Since the end of the Cold War there has been a revival in discussion in India 
about a “natural” sphere of influence extending well beyond South Asia.  
This is related to a desire to move beyond India’s traditional strategic 
preoccupations in South Asia and re-engage with its extended 
neighbourhood—to rectify what Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh called 
India’s unnecessary acceptance of “the post-Partition limits geography 
imposed on policy”.65  Even before India’s independence, K. M. Panikkar, 
India’s most famous maritime strategist, argued that the Indian Ocean must 
remain “truly Indian”, advocating the creation of a “steel ring” around India 
through the establishment of forward naval bases in Singapore, Mauritius, 
Yemen (Socatra) and Sri Lanka.66  From the turn of this century the Indian 
Ministry of Defence began describing India’s security environment as 
extending from the Persian Gulf in the west, to the Straits of Malacca in the 
east,67 an area which Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh called India’s sphere 
of influence68 and the current Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has 
somewhat more diplomatically called India’s strategic footprint.69  
While there is clearly an aspiration in New Delhi to develop an expanded 
Indian strategic space, it is not at all clear what this might mean in practice.  
There is little doubt that India’s approach to spreading its influence in the 
region differs significantly from Lord Curzon’s and it seems unlikely even in 
the long term that India will regain the regional hegemony exerted by British 
India.  However, short of hegemony, India could express regional dominance 
through the development of a more hierarchical regional order or seeking to 
exclude other powers from the region.  
To date, the Indian Navy has taken a cooperative approach in developing 
security relationships, an approach that has been relatively successful. The 
failure of India to project military power beyond the limits of South Asia 
during the Cold War has placed India in good stead in much of the Indian 
Ocean region.  India has a noticeable lack of historical baggage in many of 
its dealings in the region, with the exception of the Islamic factor arising from 
the Pakistan conflict.  India is often perceived as essentially a benign power 
and not a would-be hegemon, in contrast with other external powers such as 
the United States.  While India is not in a position to exert significant power 
through military predominance or ideological means, it may be able to do so 
as a provider of public goods.  This is certainly the current approach of the 
Indian Navy, which emphasises its ability to provide maritime policing, anti-
piracy and anti-terrorism functions.  However, there are sometimes also 
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noticeable overtones of hierarchy in India’s dealings with the region, 
particularly in India’s overt opposition to regional relationships with China. 
In the longer term, India’s role in the Indian Ocean will likely be determined 
(and limited) by the extent to which India’s naval expansion plans come to 
fruition.  Drawing on the experience of the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Holmes identifies 
three basic roles which the Indian Navy could play: first, a “free-rider” navy, 
in which the Indian Navy can play a growing role in maritime policing and 
humanitarian functions while the United States continues to play a dominant 
role; second, a “constable” navy, in which the Indian Navy would, sparingly 
and with tact, intervene in littoral states to advance a common interest of 
South Asian states; and third, a “strong-man” navy where it sought to 
establish hegemony in the Indian Ocean and had the capability of mounting 
forward defence beyond the Indian Ocean.70  Holmes concludes that the 
ambitions represented by the Indian Navy’s expansion program in the 
coming decades would give it the capability to act somewhere between a 
“free-rider” navy and a “constable” navy. 
It should be noted that the potential for an Indian sphere of influence in the 
Indian Ocean are also subject to some important caveats: although India has 
ambitions to expand its strategic space in the Indian Ocean, there are real 
questions as to whether these aspirations will be achieved.  India has a long 
history of its strategic ambitions surpassing its capabilities, of strategic goals 
and military expansion plans going unfulfilled.  The planned expansion of 
India’s naval capabilities is some decades away from being achieved and is 
highly contingent on India’s economic development.  India’s security partners 
in the Indian Ocean (with the possible exception of the Maldives) will likely 
maintain other important security relationships and will not easily grant an 
exclusive security role for India.  Most importantly, the United States has 
every reason to maintain a major regional security presence, particularly in 
the northwest Indian Ocean.  
Nevertheless, India’s aspirations to expand its strategic space in the Indian 
Ocean region are clearly related to its broader ambitions to be recognised as 
a great power, ambitions that may if anything grow in coming years.  
Certainly many would see a sphere of influence as a natural appurtenance of 
great power status.  One study of India’s regional plans concluded that:  
a rising India will try to establish regional hegemony in South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean Region … just like all the other rising powers have since 
Napoleonic times, with the long term goal of achieving great power status 
on an Asian and perhaps even global scale.71 
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From a geopolitical perspective, spheres of influence are seen as a normal 
part of ordering the international system.  According to Cohen: “ 
spheres of influence are essential to the preservation of national and 
regional expression … the alternative is either a monolithic world system or 
utter chaos”.72 
The key feature of a sphere of influence is not just the ability to project 
power, but an acknowledgement of a hierarchical relationship in which the 
great power provides security to lesser powers in return for an 
acknowledgement of a leadership role. 
China also provides good defensive reasons for the development of a 
sphere of influence.  Many Indian strategists see China’s political and 
security relationships in South Asia and its putative String of Pearls strategy 
as part of a cohesive policy of “encirclement” or “containment” of India that 
justifies the development of a “defensive” sphere of influence by India.  As 
Admiral Prakash, commented:  
The appropriate counter to China’s encirclement of India is to build our own 
relations, particularly in our neighbourhood, on the basis of our national 
interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbours.73  
As it expands its influence in the Indian Ocean region India also has had to 
accept the continuing role of the United States in the region.  The United 
States, particularly with its base at Diego Garcia and its naval facilities in 
Singapore and the Gulf, seems likely to remain the predominant naval power 
in the Indian Ocean region for many years to come.  However there are 
indications that the United States is willing to cede—and indeed 
encourage—a major regional naval role for India, particularly in the northeast 
Indian Ocean. For its part, India’s willingness to cooperate with the United 
States in achieving its ambitions is not as paradoxical as it may seem.  As 
the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once conceded, the 
United States in developing its sphere of influence in the Western 
hemisphere in the nineteenth century relied on Britain, the then superpower, 
to enforce the Monroe Doctrine until the United States was sufficiently strong 
to do so itself.74  Similarly, India may have good reason to cooperate with the 
United States while it builds its national power. However, with the exception 
of the United States, India will likely wish to cooperate with extra-regional 
navies in the Indian Ocean only as long as they recognize India’s leading 
regional role.75  The apparent willingness of Japan to recognize India’s role 
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as the “leading” maritime security provider west of the Malacca Strait forms a 
not insignificant element in the developing India-Japan security 
relationship.76   
How Australia fits in this picture is a not entirely clear.  Australia’s naval 
power ranks second only to India among the littoral states. There is no 
suggestion that India is seeking to expand its strategic space into southeast 
Indian Ocean and there is little reason for it to do so.  The junction of the 
Southern and Indian Oceans is not a choke point, nor is there any prospect 
that India might act as a security provider to Australia.  Nevertheless, 
Australia is keen to form a cooperative security relationship with India. 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper flagged the “strong mutual interest” of 
Australia and India in enhancing maritime security cooperation, commenting 
that, “As India extends its reach and influence into areas of shared strategic 
interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and our 
understanding of Indian strategic thinking”.77 This captures well Australia’s 
desire to strengthen the relationship—as well as a degree of hesitancy about 
India’s strategic objectives.  In November 2009, Australia and India 
concluded a joint security declaration, providing a framework for increased 
cooperation, particularly on small “s” security issues such as such as in 
maritime policing (piracy and maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, people 
trafficking etc), disaster management and anti-terrorism and there seem 
good prospects for closer security relations in coming years.78  Nevertheless, 
questions remain as to how the security relationship might develop in the 
long term.  While Australia has a generally benign strategic view of India, 
there is potential for a divergence of interests in some circumstances, 
including, for example, if India’s strategic partnership with the United States 
stalls or if India sought to exclude other interested states from a role in 
Indian Ocean security.79 
Conclusion  
Maritime strategy is playing an ever greater role in Indian strategic thinking.  
As India reaches for great power status, it is increasingly turning to the 
Indian Ocean as a means to expand its strategic space.  Although it currently 
operates in cooperation with the United States, India has long-term 
aspirations towards attaining naval predominance throughout much of the 
Indian Ocean. 
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In conjunction with an expansion of India’s naval capabilities, there has been 
a significant extension of India’s maritime security relationships throughout 
the region.  Much of the emphasis has been in developing relationships with 
small states at or near the key points of entry into the Indian Ocean 
(including, Mauritius, Seychelles, Oman, Qatar and Singapore).  Arguably, 
the extreme asymmetries in size have made the development of such 
relationships relatively easy—there is no question of competition or rivalry for 
example.  Some of these states have long seen India as a benign security 
provider and have maritime policing needs that India can usefully fulfil.  In 
some cases, India may not only be a cooperative security provider, but may 
also effectively act as a security guarantor, as is arguably the case with 
Mauritius and the Maldives.  
In coming years India will also need to better develop cooperative security 
relationships with the larger littoral states, including South Africa, Indonesia 
and Australia.  There is much scope for security cooperation between them, 
particularly in the maritime dimension.  However, the implications of India’s 
strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean still need to be worked through.  To 
what extent, for example, might India expect implicit acknowledgement of a 
leadership role in Indian Ocean security and/or support in any attempts to 
exclude China from the region?  A challenge for New Delhi in coming years 
will be to maintain perceptions of India as a benign and non-hegemonic 
power in the Indian Ocean region as it moves towards achieving major 
power status.  
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